Retrieval pipelines trust the documents they read. Intercept catches the poisoned ones, stopping indirect prompt injection before a retrieved file hijacks your agent.
In RAG, untrusted content becomes part of the prompt, so a single poisoned document can rewrite what your agent does.
Instructions hidden in a retrieved document or web page silently take over the agent's behavior.
A crafted document coaxes the agent into leaking retrieved context through links or tool calls.
The agent confidently states claims the source documents never made, with no way to check.
Retrieved content is inspected for hidden instructions before it ever reaches the model.
LEARN MORE →Responses are checked for exfiltration patterns and unsafe links before they leave the pipeline.
LEARN MORE →Even a hijacked agent can only do what its capability scope allows, and every call is logged.
LEARN MORE →Watch Intercept catch an indirect injection inside a retrieved file, live.